This essay discusses revolution and paradigm shift as it applies to archaeological theory. Examined here is the possible archaeological paradigm shift in the 1960’s brought about by the so-called New Archaeology. Specifically, David Meltzer’s analysis of Thomas Kuhn’s definition of paradigm is discussed. Also considered is whether post-processualism in archaeological theory may represent a paradigm shift. Lastly, a reflection regarding an archaeological post-modern science is presented.
Before he passed in 1996, Thomas Kuhn was a scientific historian and philosopher who may be most well known for the application of the term paradigm to science. As provided by David Meltzer, Kuhn defines paradigms as “universally recognized scientific achievements that for a time provide model problems and solutions to a community of practitioners” (Meltzer 1979:645). Another definition of paradigm might include The American Heritage dictionary which defines paradigm as: “a set of assumptions, concepts, values, and practices that constitutes a way of viewing reality for the community that shares them, especially in an intellectual discipline.”[1] Binford and Sabloff elaborate yet another definition of paradigm: “A paradigm is one's world view, translating one's experience into meaningful statements” (1982:138). Meltzer himself applies Margaret Masterman’s critique of Kuhn to define paradigm as a “structural” and “metaphysical” characteristic (1979:645). The four definitions of the term provide four different shades of gray reflecting its definition. Already a problem is established with the examination of paradigm shifts within archaeological theory. That there is no perfect expression of the term’s definition casts a shadow of ambiguity toward its effective use as a descriptor of events. But since Meltzer is the primary focus of this paper, we shall assume that a paradigm shift infers a metaphysical cataclysm.
New Archaeology entered the theoretical debate in the early 1960’s. It describes a method to analyze the archaeological record different from the previous endeavors of cultural history practitioners. Some have described the entry and practice of New Archaeology variously as a revolution and paradigm shift. But as he interprets Kuhn, Meltzer thinks differently. He believes that revolution and paradigm shifts that are referred to in the archaeological literature are straw men, and instead, that revolutionary change requires an upheaval in “Weltanschauung” or earthquake type of transformation (Meltzer 1979:651). For Meltzer, the New Archaeology does not represent a metaphysical shift. He scrutinizes New Archaeology with a critique of the 1972 paper “Environment, subsistence and society: the changing archaeological perspective” authored by Ezra E. B. Zubrow. Meltzer demonstrates Zubrow’s “approaches to the problem” are simply methodological changes to acquire the same “cultural reconstruction” goals of earlier scholars (Meltzer 1979:651). Meltzer also critiques a piece by Paul S. Martin entitled “The revolution in archaeology.” Here Meltzer illustrates how Martin’s own rhetoric argues for methodological change and against revolution (Meltzer 1979). Further, Meltzer illustrates the heterogeneity of archaeological theory since the beginning of New Archaeology by relating a citation analysis of American Antiquity conducted by Eugene L. Sterud. Sterud’s study demonstrates that prior to 1960 a congruence of thought or central reference existed in archaeological scholarship. Following 1960, there began an ever-increasing divergence from the central reference. The study infers not paradigm shift or a revolution, but decentralization into a variety of research methods and approaches. For Meltzer, New Archaeology represents not a Kuhnian paradigm shift or a revolution but merely a progressive link in a linear chain of methodological evolution (Meltzer 1979:654).
Meltzer had hoped to arouse debate with the publication of “Paradigms and the nature of change in American Archaeology” (Meltzer 1981). There were others who applied the relevance of Kuhnian paradigm shift to archaeological theory, but chose not enter the squared circle with Meltzer (for instance, Binford and Sabloff 1982). However, there was an unfortunate soul who decided to spar with Meltzer and his perspective of Kuhnian paradigm. Jay F. Custer is (or was at the time) of the mind that the New Archaeology does represent paradigm shift and revolution in archaeological theory (Custer 1981). Custer believed that Meltzer got it mostly wrong. He quoted other researchers to demonstrate that earlier archaeology had been for the sake of archaeology but later became useful in the study of contemporary cultures. Custer wrote “the shift from particularistic reconstructions as ends in themselves… to the use of reconstructions as bases for nomothetic explanations represents a major [Meltzerian type of] metaphysical reorientation” (1981:661). In his response, Meltzer took a brief moment to place Custer squarely in the center of the ring. Then Meltzer took off the gloves and proceeded to treat Custer like a punching bag. There is not room here to describe all the rhetorical kung fu that Meltzer employed, but suffice to say that Custer was out of his league. For every jab Custer had made, Meltzer countered with an experienced and buttressed riposte. And then the final knockout blow came when Meltzer pointed out that Custer falsified his own assertions (like the one quoted above), when Custer cited Binford with: “[there is some] confusion about the meaning of [nomothetic] explanation” (Custer 1981:861). Custer did not mention Kuhn even once. Perhaps Custer’s failing was that he didn’t understand that the purpose of Meltzer’s paper was neither to deny or support whether a revolution had occurred within archaeology, but instead to generally critique other authors misinterpretation in the application of Kuhn’s work to New Archaeology. It’s easy to see, even if it had been a more even match, why Binford waited a year, chose a different arena and avoided citing Meltzer altogether before he produced anything for publication regarding the Kuhnian paradigm shift of New Archaeology (Binford and Sabloff 1982).
I do not believe the rise of post-processualism represents a Kuhnian paradigm shift. Meltzer adds to his argument (as do I) quoting Kuhn “that in the absence of a paradigm, ‘all the facts that could possibly pertain to the development of a given science are likely to seem equally relevant’” (Meltzer 1979: 645). “Equally relevant” is one of the terms used by Ramenofsky to describe post-processualism (2008, personal communication). I refer back to Sterud’s study. I mentioned earlier that the study infers not paradigm shift or a revolution, but decentralization. I believe that the study suggests archaeology is much like the sound of an orchestra tuning up before a performance: the cacophony of an undisciplined discipline. Different research methods and schools of thought expand on original data and provide a broader understanding of the archaeological record. “Although different positions are always argued with self-righteous conviction, the fact remains that no single view has come to dominate the field” (Dunnel 1993:209). It seems most archaeological scholars since the mid-60’s stake out his or her unique territory in the fresh snow of unmarked theoretical terrain provided by some variant or combination of low-, mid- and high-level theories or other revisionist or nomothetic tool that can be modified to suit their research purposes. Post-processualism is not a Kuhnian paradigm shift, but an additional tool that can be used to accumulate and decipher archaeological information. Archaeology is not a place for the agoraphobic because the theoretical realm becomes more crowded with each new PhD. “Prior to the formulation of the discipline as a science… there are any number of contrasting and competing ‘schools of thought.’ This ‘pre-paradigm stage’ is characterized by the absence of a common body of belief”(Meltzer 1979:645). If there is anything that describes archaeology in it’s present form, it is the absence of a common body of belief. And yet despite the efforts of brilliant men and women to grasp the brass ring, it is clear that archaeology has yet to become a science. If Kuhn is right, maybe archaeology is on the verge of its greatest performance and the paradigm shift is nigh.
A post-modern science will not be post-processual. Science is reasoned and logical: post-processualism (PP) is against reason and logic. Science is systematic and methodical: PP is abstract and conceptual. Science is deductive: PP is inductive. Science attempts to be objective. PP claims science is biased. Science seeks to explain data. PP interprets data. Science has laws and builds upon itself to create knowledge. In PP everything is relative. A dichotomy exists in archeological theory between science and PP. As I understand the theories and terms, a post-processional science is an oxymoron. It may have been sidestepped in the cultural historical period, but archaeology can no longer exist without science. However, PP shows no sign of slowing its mitosis.
The scholars who have spoken out about a paradigm shift in archaeology are brilliant, logical and thoughtful. From my perspective, what is interesting about the paradigm/lines of approach debate is that both arguments have merit. Revolution and paradigm shift are strong words and connote major changes. Custer does not undermine Meltzer’s argument against the Kuhnian definition. Yet, maybe there is a paradigm shift in archaeology: it began with the appearance of New Archaeology, we are in the midst of revolution among the clouds of post-processualism and the culmination is the Holy Grail of a postmodern science.
References Cited
Binford, Lewis R. and Jeremy A. Sabloff
1982 Paradigms, Systematics, and Archaeology. Journal of Anthropological Research, 38:2 pp. 137-153.
Custer, Jay F.
1981 Comments on David Meltzer’s Paradigms and the nature of Change in American Archaeology. American Antiquity 46: 660-661.
Dunnell, Robert C.
1993 Archaeology and Evolutionary Science. In Quandaries and Quests: Visions of Archaeology’s Future, edited by LuAnn Wandsnider, pp. 209-224. Center for Archaeological Investigations, Southern Illinois University at Carbondale, Occasional Paper No. 20.
Margaret Masterman
1970 The nature of a paradigm. In Criticism and the growth of knowledge, edited by I Lakatos and A. Musgrave, pp. 59-90. Cambridge University Press, London
Paul S. Martin
1971 The revolution in archaeology. American Antiquity 36:1-8
Meltzer, David J.
1979 Paradigms and the Nature of Change in American Archaeology. American Antiquity 44:644-657.
Meltzer, David J.
1981 Paradigms Lost, Paradigms Found. American Antiquity 46: 662-665.
Ramenofsky, Ann F.
2008 Personal communication. Anthropology 320: Strategies of Archaeology, power point presentation and lecture notes September 2, 2008
Sterud, Eugene L.
1978 Changing aims of American archaeology: a citations analysis of American Antiquity –1946—1975. American Antiquity 43:294-302.
Zubrow, Ezra E. B.
1972 Environment, subsistence and society: the changing archaeological perspective. Annual Review of Anthropology 1:179-206.
[1] paradigm. (n.d.). The American Heritage® Dictionary of the English Language, Fourth Edition. Retrieved December 10, 2008, from Dictionary.com website: http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/paradigm
